In this paper, we focus on a particular subcase of the pragmatics problem that has attracted 48 widespread interest from philosophers of language and builders of computational systems 49 alike: namely, the way in which we identify dialogue act types. The following section 50 discusses why this is an important issue for both human-human interactions and for artificial 51 spoken dialogue systems. We then outline some of the most productive linguistic and 52 computational attempts to address this issue. We conclude by considering how these 53 methods might usefully be synthesised into a coherent interdisciplinary approach to dialogue 54 act type recognition.
55
Dialogue act recognition in interaction 56 As pointed out by Austin (1962) , our use of language does not just consist of asserting 57
propositions. More broadly, we perform "speech acts". That is to say, we "do things with 58 words" -we use utterances to achieve particular effects. We may request an action,
59
acknowledge a request, ask for information, and so on. From this perspective, we can see 60 language as a tool that we can use in order to accomplish things that we would not be able to 61 accomplish by other forms of physical action. We can also analyse individual instances of 62 language use as social actions that are performed in order to elicit specific responses, which 63 might involve obtaining information or causing interlocutors to act upon the physical world 64 in particular ways.
65
The usefulness of linguistic acts in enabling specific social accomplishments cannot easily be 66 treated in terms of truth conditions: it doesn't generally make sense to describe a request as 67 "true" or "false", for instance. Austin introduced the notion of "illocutionary act" to describe 68 this kind of function, a notion which was later elaborated by Searle (1975) . Although this 69 research tradition is referred to as speech act theory, here we will use the term "dialogue act" 70 rather than "speech act" to emphasise that the relevant actions may be achieved by other 71 means than through speech (for instance, gesture, eye-gaze, and so on 
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Given that the responses are usually faster than this, usually pertinent, and usually conform to 139 the dialogic strictures laid down by the speaker (for instance, a question will be met with an 140 answer), this strongly suggests that the hearer must often be aware of the nature of the 141 speaker's dialogue act before it is complete.
142
In a similar vein, we might interpret the nature of back-channel responses (Yngve 1970 attempts to initiate a turn. Schegloff (1982) refers to a subset of these as "continuers", on the 146 basis that they serve to assure the speaker of the hearer's attention and indicate that the turn 147 can continue. Various utterances can fulfil this function, among them "uh-huh" and "yeah".
However, it appears likely that the appropriate choice of back-channel response depends to a 149 certain extent upon the dialogue act being performed by the speaker -for instance, "yeah" In sum, there appears to be quite convincing evidence that human dialogue participants are 155 able to draw rich inferences about dialogue act types from very early on in a dialogue turn.
156
In the following section, we examine some approaches to explaining how this process might 157 take place.
158

Approaches to dialogue act recognition
159
A linguistic approach to dialogue act recognition was offered by Gazdar (1981) , who One possibility is to appeal to traditional pragmatic notions of cooperativity and, in 170 particular, relevance. Gordon and Lakoff (1971) suggest that reanalysis occurs when the 171 hearer realises that the surface meaning of the utterance is inappropriate given the context. For instance, a speaker asking "Could you pass the salt?" typically knows that the hearer is 173 able to do so, and the hearer can infer from this that the purpose of the utterance is not to 174 enquire as to their salt-passing capabilities. For the utterance not to be a waste of effort, 175 therefore, there must be some other purpose to it. Searle (1975) tells a slightly different 176 story: on his account, the 'natural' answer to the question "Could you pass the salt?" (namely: 177 yes, the hearer could do so) must be relevant to the speaker. A possible reason for this is that 178 the speaker wants the salt; and the hearer, being cooperative, should therefore pass the salt to 179 the speaker, without an explicit request being necessary.
180
Can we, however, reconcile this kind of account with the data on turn-taking discussed notwithstanding that it is formally part of an interrogative sentence-form.
211
An alternative approach, foreshadowed by Levinson (1983) , is to dispense with the Literal
212
Meaning Hypothesis, and instead treat the identification of dialogue act type as a puzzle to be 213 solved by any means available. That is not to propose that the hearer ignores the sentence-214 type: that might be a valuable clue to the dialogue act type. However, according to Levinson, 
301
In particular, a domain-general system that identified highly specific dialogue acts would 302 necessarily have to incorporate thousands of distinct dialogue acts. Consider the receptionist 303 scenario: a person entering the building might request the receptionist to make a call to any 304 individual in the building, using the form of words "Could you call X?" A system that treats 305 every such request completely separately, depending on the identity of X, could not make 306 useful generalisations across this set of requests. For instance, if the name of X is mumbled 307 or unfamiliar, it will not be able to respond "Sorry, who?" unless it identifies the utterance as 308 a request: it could only announce its inability to respond to the request as a whole, which 309 might prompt futile reformulations ("I would like to talk to X"). That is, although such a 310 system might be very efficient at learning the mappings between specific strings and specific 311 tasks, it will struggle to generalise these mappings in any remotely human-like way.
312
Similarly, if it is possible to make generalisations about dialogue act sequences (e.g. 
